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We discuss the security implications of noise for quantum coin tossing protocols. We find that
if quantum error correction can be used, so that noise levels can be made arbitrarily small, then
reasonable security conditions for coin tossing can be framed so that results from the noiseless case
will continue to hold. If, however, error correction is not available (as is the case with present day
technology), and significant noise is present, then tossing a single coin becomes problematic. In
this case, we are led to consider random n-bit string generation in the presence of noise, rather
than single-shot coin tossing. We introduce precise security criteria for n-bit string generation and
describe an explicit protocol that could be implemented with present day technology. In general, a
cheater can exploit noise in order to bias coins to their advantage. We derive explicit upper bounds
on the average bias achievable by a cheater for given noise levels.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Pp, 05.40.Ca
The cryptographic task of coin tossing was first intro-
duced by Blum [1]. Briefly, the idea is that two sepa-
rated, mistrustful parties wish to generate a random bit
and be sure that the other party cannot have biased the
bit by more than a certain amount. Secure coin tossing is
known to be impossible classically, unless either compu-
tational assumptions or special relativistic considerations
[2] are invoked. Upon using a quantum communication
channel, however, it is possible to achieve levels of secu-
rity that are impossible classically. Various results con-
cerning the security of quantum coin tossing under dif-
ferent assumptions, and its relationship to other crypto-
graphic tasks (in particular, bit commitment), have been
obtained [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
It would be highly desirable to implement quantum
coin tossing experimentally. Long distance quantum
communication is indeed possible with present technol-
ogy [16], and it may be possible to adapt such techniques
to coin tossing. In real life situations, however, state
preparation, communication channels and measurements
are all imperfect, while all the above results refer to the
ideal situation where no noise is present. As the example
of quantum key distribution illustrates, a large amount of
theoretical work must be carried out before an idealized
quantum communication protocol can be implemented
experimentally with the effect of all experimental imper-
fections taken into account. The present work initiates
this line of investigation in the case of quantum coin toss-
ing.
In particular, we shall argue that if quantum error cor-
rection can be used, then noise can in principle be made
arbitrarily small, and one can frame security definitions
such that results holding in the noiseless case still apply.
On the other hand, if techniques such as quantum error
correction are not available (as is the case with present
day technology), then there will be a significant level of
noise that cannot be reduced. In this case, tossing a sin-
gle coin is problematic, in the sense that it is not possible
to frame sensible security conditions that can actually be
satisfied. But tossing a string of coins such that the av-
erage bias is bounded is possible. We obtain detailed
results concerning the relation between the amount of
noise and this average bias.
We begin with some definitions that have been intro-
duced for noiseless coin tossing (see, e.g., Ref. [8]). A coin
tossing protocol involves a sequence of rounds of commu-
nication, at the end of which either a bit x is produced,
whose value is agreed on by both parties, or one party
or the other aborts, in which case we write symbolically
x = ∞. We denote by PrSA,SB (x = c) the probability
that x = c, assuming that Alice follows a strategy SA
and Bob SB. We denote Alice’s honest strategy (i.e.,
that defined by the protocol) as HA and Bob’s as HB. A
protocol is correct if, for c = 0, 1
PrHA,HB (x = c) = 1/2. (1)
Security conditions are written as
∀SA PrSA,HB (x = 0) ≤ 1/2 + ǫA (2)
∀SA PrSA,HB (x = 1) ≤ 1/2 + ǫA (3)
∀SB PrHA,SB (x = 0) ≤ 1/2 + ǫB (4)
∀SB PrHA,SB (x = 1) ≤ 1/2 + ǫB. (5)
(These conditions define the task known as strong coin
tossing. A weaker task can be defined by imposing only
(2) and (5). This is known as weak coin tossing. In
this work we are concerned only with strong coin toss-
ing. With this understood, we shall simply call it coin
tossing.) A protocol is perfectly secure iff ǫA = ǫB = 0.
A protocol is arbitrarily secure iff ǫA and ǫB can be
made arbitrarily small as some parameter associated with
the protocol increases. A protocol is partially secure iff
2ǫA, ǫB < 1/2. Perfectly secure coin tossing is shown
to be impossible in Ref. [4]. More recently, Kitaev has
shown [15] that for any possible protocol, either ǫA or
ǫB ≥ 1/
√
2 − 1/2. This result implies that arbitrarily
secure strong coin tossing is impossible. At present, the
best protocol for strong coin tossing is due to Ambainis
[9] and achieves ǫA = ǫB = 1/4 (close to Kitaev’s lower
bound).
In order to discuss what happens when noise is present,
we first describe a very simple protocol for coin tossing
in the absence of noise (it is similar to the protocol for
quantum gambling developed in Ref. [17]). The protocol
is for strong coin tossing and is partially secure. It is not
as good as that of Ambainis, but is illustrative. We shall
then consider how it is affected by noise. The protocol is
as follows.
i) Alice generates a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and prepares
a quantum state |φb〉, where 0 < |〈φ0|φ1〉|2 < 1. We write
|〈φ0|φ1〉|2 ≡ cos2 θ. Alice sends |φb〉 to Bob.
ii) Bob generates a random bit b′ and sends it to Alice.
iii) Alice sends b to Bob.
iv) Bob measures the quantum state in a basis contain-
ing |φb〉 to check that Alice is not cheating. He aborts if
he gets an outcome different from |φb〉. In this case we
write the outcome of the coin toss as x =∞. Otherwise,
the outcome of the coin toss is x = b ⊕ b′.
It is easy to show that Alice’s best cheating strategy
is to send a state |χ〉 such that |〈χ|φ0〉|2 = |〈χ|φ1〉|2 =
cos2 θ/2, and then to declare b as she requires. (In partic-
ular, it is never to her advantage to declare the opposite
value of b, and this implies that strategies that involve
her entangling two systems and sending one to Bob can-
not help.) Bob’s best cheating strategy is to measure the
quantum state as soon as he receives it, in order to de-
termine as well as possible whether it is |φ0〉 or |φ1〉 [5].
We get that for c = 0, 1,
∀SA PrSA,HB (x = c) ≤ 1/2 + (1/2) cos θ
∀SB PrHA,SB (x = c) ≤ 1/2 + (1/2) sin θ. (6)
Note that the protocol is correct.
How are this protocol, and the corresponding secu-
rity considerations, affected if it is assumed that noise
is present? We discuss mainly the case in which the
quantum channel separating Alice and Bob is noisy, but
in which all other devices are perfect. Other types of
experimental imperfections that could be considered in-
clude, for example, noise in state preparation and mea-
surement, or the limited efficiency of detectors. The ar-
guments we use in the case of noisy channels can easily be
adapted to these other situations. In general, the channel
can be described by a linear, completely positive, trace-
preserving map E . Thus Bob will receive the noisy state
ρa = E(|ψa〉). For long distance quantum communica-
tion the principal type of noise will be losses. Losses can
in principle be included in the form of E , but it may be
convenient to consider them separately. An honest party
must assume that the other, potentially dishonest, party
can control everything outside the honest party’s labora-
tory. In particular, this means that a cheater can replace
the noisy channel with a noiseless one, introducing noise
only as and when he or she wants.
The presence of noise on the face of it affords several
simple cheating strategies. We list a few.
i) If the channel is lossy, and the rules specify that if
Bob’s detector does not fire then he simply has to accept
whatever value of b Alice declares, then Alice may cheat
simply by not sending any quantum state at all. Bob
will think that the state was lost in the channel. Alice
will declare whatever value of b she wants, winning with
certainty.
ii) Suppose alternately that the rules specify that if
Bob receives no state, he is allowed to declare “no fire,”
and the protocol recommences. Then a cheating Bob
may replace the noisy, lossy channel with a noiseless one,
so that the states he must discriminate are pure. He then
(using a perfect detector) performs a conclusive measure-
ment on the quantum state, with outcomes “definitely
|φ0〉,” “definitely |φ1〉,” and “inconclusive” [18]. If the
“inconclusive” result is obtained, then Bob declares “no
fire,” and the protocol repeats. The protocol will keep
repeating until a run occurs on which Bob finds out the
value of b with certainty. He can then obtain the outcome
he wants with certainty by choosing b′ appropriately.
iii) In general, both ρ0 and ρ1 will have support on the
entire Hilbert space. This means that a cheating Alice
can send |φ0〉 to Bob, and then declare that b = 0 or
b = 1 as she needs. Even in the event that Alice declares
b = 1, there will be no measurement result of Bob’s that
tells him for certain that Alice is cheating.
In addition, if the channel is noisy and if a certain out-
come of Bob’s leads him to abort the protocol, then there
is a nonzero probability that he may obtain this result
even when Alice is honest. In this case, the protocol is
no longer correct, because there is a nonzero probability
that a player aborts, even when both are honest.
It should be clear that most of these remarks will apply
in some form or other to any conceivable coin tossing
protocol. If correctness is redefined as
PrHA,HB (x = c) = (1− δ)/2
PrHAHB (x =∞) = δ, (7)
for c = 0, 1, where δ must tend to zero as some parame-
ter associated with the protocol increases, and if similar
modifications are made to the security conditions, then
protocols can still be made (at least partially) secure, as
long as error correction is available. In this work, how-
ever, we are interested in the case in which there is no
technique for making noise arbitrarily small. Protocols
for tossing a single coin will then either allow one of the
parties to bias the coin completely, or will abort with un-
acceptably high probability even though both parties are
3honest. They are therefore of limited interest. For these
reasons we consider instead a slightly different scenario,
in which Alice and Bob want to generate a random n-bit
string.
The basic reason why random n-bit string generation
is easier to implement in the presence of noise is that,
since the quantum channel is used many times, one can
test that the average noise level is as expected. This is
to be contrasted with a single use of the channel, which
only provides very partial information about the noise
present. Furthermore the probability that the protocol
aborts when both parties are honest decreases exponen-
tially with n. This is due to the fact that the chan-
nel is used many times, which makes large fluctuations
about the expected noise highly improbable. On the
other hand, because the noise is only constrained on av-
erage, a cheater can determine any bit of the string with
certainty. This implies that one cannot extract from the
bit string a single unbiased bit (for instance by taking
the parity of the bit string). But the average bias of the
bits can be bounded [22].
The problem of generating a random n-bit string in
the absence of noise has previously been considered by
Kent [14], who showed that it is not a straightforward
extension of the problem of generating a single random
bit. We now introduce some precise security criteria for
n-bit string generation. The output of a protocol for
n-bit string generation is ~x, where either ~x is an n-bit
string, or one or the other party aborts, in which case we
write symbolically ~x =∞.
One security condition that one could imagine for n-bit
string generation is that each bit of the string has small
bias. This could be expressed as
∀SA∀i PrSA,HB (xi = c) ≤ 1/2 + ǫA, (8)
for c = 0, 1, along with a similar condition for Bob. Here,
xi is the ith bit of ~x. As we have argued above, this type
of security is not achievable in the presence of noise.
A weaker security condition is that on average the bias
of the bits is small. We express this as
∀SA∀~c 1
n
∑
i
PrSA,HB (xi = ci) ≤ 1/2 + ǫA, (9)
along with a similar condition for Bob. We have that xi,
ci are the ith bits of ~x,~c, with ~c an arbitrary n-bit string
describing a possible result of the coin tosses.
Other security conditions are possible. Satisfaction of
condition (8) or (9) is compatible with a cheater fixing
things so that the outcome is either 00 . . .0 with proba-
bility 1/2 or 11 . . .1, with probability 1/2. It would be
desirable to have a security condition expressing the fact
that the entropy of the bit string is large, satisfaction of
which would rule out such cheating. In the remainder
of this article, however, we will restrict ourselves to the
security condition expressed by Eq. (9). In general, ǫA
and ǫB will depend on n. For simplicity we shall only be
interested in the values of these quantities in the limit of
large n.
We define correctness by
∀~c PrHA,HB (~x = ~c) = (1− δ)/2n
PrHA,HB (~x =∞) = δ, (10)
where δ must tend to zero as n becomes large.
We now introduce a protocol for random n-bit string
generation that is adapted from the simple coin tossing
protocol above. Then we will consider the security of this
protocol in the presence of noise.
1) For i = 1 to n:
i) Alice generates a random bit bi ∈ {0, 1}, and pre-
pares a quantum state |φbi 〉, where 0 < |〈φ0|φ1〉|2 < 1.
Alice sends |φbi〉 to Bob.
ii) Bob generates a random bit b′i and sends it to Alice.
iii) Alice sends bi to Bob.
iv) Bob measures the quantum state in a random basis.
If his detector fails, this is considered as a null outcome.
Next i.
2) Bob uses his measurement statistics to estimate
ρ0, the average state he received when Alice declared
bi = 0, and ρ1, the average state he received when Alice
declared bi = 1. If either of the fidelities, 〈φ0|ρ0|φ0〉 and
〈φ1|ρ1|φ1〉, is less than 1− γ (where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is decided
in advance), then Bob aborts the protocol. Otherwise the
output of the protocol is an n-bit string with xi = bi⊕b′i.
This protocol is essentially the simple protocol above
repeated n times, with two modifications. First, Bob
measures each time in a random basis - he is performing
a sort of state estimation in order that he can bound
any potential cheating by Alice. Second, an honest Bob
does not have the option of aborting until the end of
the protocol when he has collected all his statistics. It is
easy to see that if the fidelity of the whole process of state
preparation, transmission and measurement is F > 1−γ,
then the protocol is correct.
We investigate available cheating strategies for this
protocol, assuming that the only noise is noise in the
quantum channel, described by E , and that either there
are no losses or they are included in the form of E . We
can consider two cases. In the first, a cheater’s actions
on different runs (that is, different values of i in the pro-
tocol above) are uncorrelated. Thus, we simply need to
consider one strategy, perhaps involving random choices,
that is repeated for each run. In the second, a cheater’s
actions on different runs may be correlated, and may
even involve entanglement across the different runs [23].
In this paper, we will restrict ourselves to uncorrelated
cheating. Elsewhere, we show that this protocol in fact
satisfies an entropic security condition, even when corre-
lated or entangled attacks are considered [19].
A cheating Bob is easiest to deal with. His best strat-
egy is to replace the noisy channel with a noiseless one,
4thus ensuring that the states he receives are |φ0〉 and
|φ1〉. He can measure each state as soon as he receives
it, in order to determine as well as possible the iden-
tity of the state. He can then choose b′i appropriately.
As mentioned before, this gives ǫB = 1/2 sin θ, where
|〈φ0|φ1〉|2 = cos2 θ.
The most general strategy for a cheating Alice is to
prepare a pure state |ψ〉AB , and send the B subsystem
to Bob via a noiseless channel. (In general, of course, Al-
ice may prepare an overall mixed state, perhaps resulting
from a probabilistic mixture of pure states. We lose no
generality, however, by supposing that Alice prepares a
pure state, as Alice can always introduce an extra ancilla
such that |ψ〉AB is a purification of the mixed state.) We
denote the reduced density matrix for Bob’s subsystem
by ρB. Alice then waits for the bit b
′
i. The value of b
′
i and
the outcome of the coin toss that she wants determine to-
gether the value of bi that Alice wants to declare. If Alice
wants to declare bi = 0, then she performs a two-outcome
positive operator-valued (POV) measurement M0 on the
A subsystem. Denoting the outcomes M00 and M01, Al-
ice declares bi = 0 (thus winning) if she obtains M00 and
bi = 1 (thus losing) if she obtains M01. If Alice wants
to declare bi = 1, on the other hand, then she performs
a POV measurement M1. She declares bi = 0 (losing) if
she obtains M10 and bi = 1 (winning) if she obtainsM11.
What advantage does this strategy give Alice? Sup-
pose that Bob’s (normalized) reduced density matrices,
conditioned on Alice getting the outcomes M00, M01,
M10 and M11, are σ, σ¯, τ¯ and τ respectively. Then we
can write
ρB = q σ + (1− q) σ¯, (11)
ρB = q
′ τ + (1− q′) τ¯ , (12)
where q is the probability of Alice getting outcome M00,
given that she performs measurement M0, and q
′ is the
probability of her getting outcome M11, given that she
performs measurement M1. It can be shown via a sym-
metry argument that we do not lose generality if we sup-
pose that
q = q′. (13)
We can also write
ρB =
1
2
(ρ0 + ρ1) , (14)
ρ0 = q σ + (1− q) τ¯ , (15)
ρ1 = q
′ τ + (1 − q′) σ¯. (16)
The probability of Alice getting the outcome she wants
is given by q, so we have that ǫA = q − 1/2. The prob-
lem is now to maximize q subject to the constraints
of Eqs. (11)-(16) (and of course the constraints that
0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and that σ, σ¯, τ, τ¯ are valid normalized den-
sity operators). Note that if we find a solution for valid
σ, σ¯, τ, τ¯ , then the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters (HJW) the-
orem [20] ensures that there does indeed exist a strat-
egy of Alice’s that corresponds to this solution. In other
words, there is a state |ψ〉AB, and measurementsM0 and
M1, that give rise to σ, σ¯, τ, τ¯ when we condition on Al-
ice’s outcomes.
We have obtained an upper bound on Alice’s cheating
capacity that applies for arbitrary quantum states and
noise. We write the fidelity between a general state ρ
and a pure state |ψ〉 as F (ρ, |ψ〉) ≡ 〈ψ|ρ|ψ〉. We write
the trace distance between two general states ρ and ρ′
as D(ρ, ρ′) ≡ 1/2||ρ − ρ′||, where ||A|| = Tr
√
A†A. All
the results concerning these quantities used below can
be found in Ref. [21] (although note that the fidelity is
defined slightly differently).
Theorem 1 For all uncorrelated strategies of Alice, we
have that for large n,
ǫA ≤
√
2γ
sin2 θ
. (17)
To prove this bound, note that if Bob is not to abort we
must have F (ρ0, |φ0〉) ≥ 1− γ, and that this, along with
Eq. (15), gives
q 〈φ0|σ|φ0〉+ (1− q) 〈φ0|τ¯ |φ0〉 ≥ 1− γ.
This in turn implies
〈φ0|σ|φ0〉 ≥ 1− γ/q.
Using the fact thatD(ρ, ρ′) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, ρ′) for arbitrary
states ρ and ρ′, this gives us
D(σ, |φ0〉) ≤
√
γ/q.
Similarly, we can derive D(τ¯ , |φ0〉) ≤
√
γ/(1− q),
D(σ¯, |φ1〉) ≤
√
γ/(1− q), and D(τ, |φ1〉) ≤
√
γ/q. We
now recall, from Eqs. (11)-(13), that
ρB = q σ + (1 − q) σ¯ = q τ + (1− q) τ¯ .
Combining this with the above, and using the fact that
D(ρ, ρ′) = maxP |Tr(P ρ)− Tr(P ρ′)|, where the maxi-
mum is over all projection operators, we get that
q
(
Tr(P |φ0〉〈φ0|)−
√
γ/q
)
+ (1− q)(Tr(P |φ1〉〈φ1|)−√
γ/(1− q)) ≤ q(Tr(P |φ1〉〈φ1|) +√γ/q)+
(1 − q)(Tr(P |φ0〉〈φ0|) +√γ/(1− q)), (18)
for any projection operator P . Setting P = |φ0〉〈φ0| then
gives Theorem 1.
We have also analyzed in detail the simple case in
which the quantum states are qubit states and the chan-
nel is a depolarizing channel, acting as ρ −→ E(ρ) ≡
f ρ + (1 − f) I/2. In this case, Alice’s optimal cheating
strategy can be found explicitly:
5Theorem 2 For the qubit depolarizing channel, if Alice
adopts her optimal uncorrelated cheating strategy, then
for large n
ǫA =
1
2
(1− f sin θ) if f ≤ f∗,
ǫA =
1
2
√
f2(1− f2) cos2 θ
1− f2 cos2 θ if f > f
∗, (19)
where f∗ ≡ (√1 + 3 cos2 θ − sin θ)/2 cos2 θ.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the appendix.
We can compare this result with the upper bound
above. If we set f = 1 − 2γ, then for fixed θ, we find
that ǫA → √γ cot θ, as γ → 0. This shows that the γ
dependence of Eq. (17) is close to optimal.
In conclusion, we have shown that the attainable secu-
rity in quantum coin tossing is qualitatively affected by
the presence of noise. Indeed in the presence of signifi-
cant noise, tossing a single coin does not give acceptable
security. Rather, in this case one should consider pro-
tocols for generation of strings of random bits. As we
explain above, generating a string of random bits is a
weaker protocol than tossing a single coin. However in
situations where one needs to toss coins many times in
succession (for instance if one wants to play repeatedly
with a quantum casino), then bit-string generation can
be useful. The importance of bit-string generation is that
even in situations where tossing a single coin is impossi-
ble, it will be possible to generate a string of bits such
that the average bias of the bits is bounded. We have
illustrated this by a simple protocol for which we prove
bounds on the average bias in the case where uncorre-
lated cheating strategies are used.
Our work is motivated by the present status of quan-
tum communication. Indeed with present day optical
technology, quantum communication can be performed
over short distances (e.g., laboratory length scales) with
minimal noise and absorption. In this case, Theorem 1
above indicates that quantum n-bit string generation, us-
ing our protocol, should be practically possible with good
security. Over longer distances (kilometers and above),
losses in particular are significant, and our results would
need to be generalized.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
To prove Theorem 2, note that without loss of gener-
ality we can write
|φ0〉〈φ0| = 1/2 (I + ασz − βσx) ,
|φ1〉〈φ1| = 1/2 (I + ασz + βσx) , (20)
where σx and σz are Pauli sigma matrices, α
2 + β2 = 1,
and we have that α = cos θ, β = sin θ. Recall that the
channel acts as
ρ −→ E(ρ) ≡ fρ+ (1− f)I/2. (21)
We then begin by writing
ρ0 = 1/2 (I + αfσz − βfσx) ,
ρ1 = 1/2 (I + αfσz + βfσx) (22)
and
qσ = 1/2 (qI + sxσx + syσy + szσz) ,
(1− q)σ¯ = 1/2 ((1− q)I + s¯xσx + s¯yσy + s¯zσz) ,
qτ = 1/2 (qI + txσx + tyσy + tzσz) ,
(1− q)τ¯ = 1/2 ((1− q)I + t¯xσx + t¯yσy + t¯zσz) ,
(23)
where −1 ≤ sx, sy, sz ≤ 1, and so on. Conditions (11)-
(16) imply
sz + s¯z = fα, sx + s¯x = 0,
tz + t¯z = fα, tx + t¯x = 0,
sz + t¯z = fα, sx + t¯x = −fβ,
s¯z + tz = fα, s¯x + tx = fβ, (24)
while symmetry considerations imply
sy = s¯y = ty = t¯y = 0. (25)
From the positivity of the matrices σ, σ¯, τ, τ¯ , we then have
that
s2z + s
2
x ≤ q2,
(fα− sz)2 + s2x ≤ (1− q)2,
s2z + (fβ + sx)
2 ≤ q2,
(fα− sz)2 + (fβ + sx)2 ≤ (1− q)2. (26)
Our aim is to maximize q with respect to sx and sz,
subject to the various constraints. The HJW theorem
[20] will ensure that there do exist measurements M0
and M1, such that conditions (11), (12), and (23) are
satisfied.
By inspection we see that the maximum value of q can
be obtained when sx = −fβ/2. This leaves
s2z + 1/4(f
2β2) ≤ q2,
(fα− sz)2 + 1/4(f2β2) ≤ (1− q)2. (27)
If we consider the equation derived from each of these
inequalities, we see that each represents a hyperbola in
the qsz plane. Geometrical considerations tell us that
there are two cases to be considered. In the first case, we
need only find a turning point of the second hyperbola,
and it is guaranteed to lie above the first hyperbola, so
6that the first inequality will be satisfied. This occurs if
f2α2 ≤ 1− f |β| (i.e., f ≤ f∗). In this case, it is easy to
see that we maximize q by setting sz = fα, giving
q = 1− (1/2)(f |β|),
ǫA = (1/2)(1− sin θ). (28)
In the second case, the relevant turning point of the sec-
ond hyperbola lies below the first, implying that this is
not a solution that satisfies both inequalities. This oc-
curs if f2α2 > 1 − f |β| (i.e., f > f∗). In this case, we
find the maximum q by finding the intersection of the
two hyperbolae, i.e., by considering both inequalities as
equalities. A short calculation then gives
q =
1
2
+
1
2
√
f2α2(1− f2)
1− f2α2 ,
ǫA =
1
2
√
f2(1 − f2) cos2 θ
1− f2 cos2 θ , (29)
which is achieved when
sz =
1
2
fα+
q
fα
− 1
2fα
. (30)
Throughout, we have ignored solutions corresponding to
unphysical values of the variables. The explicit forms
for Alice’s measurements M0 and M1 can be calculated
from the values for the ss and the ts, although we have
not done this here.
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